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Introduction 
 
Our concerns on the potential impact of the proposed new Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) were first expressed following the release of the second Consultative Paper 
(CP2) in January 2001.2 However, since that time a number of modifications have 
been made to the proposals that go some way to addressing these original concerns.  
 
The most recent paper of ours on this subject was published in the Financial 
Regulator in September 2002. This paper reiterated our concerns about the potential 
impact of the proposals on developing and emerging economies, assessed the likely 
impact of the modifications announced by that time, and highlighted remaining areas 
of concern. These were twofold: 
 
1. Widespread adoption of the IRB approach by internationally active banks 
would lead to a significant increase (decrease) in capital requirements for 
loans to lower (higher) rated borrowers. To the extent that the pricing and 
availability of international bank loans is influenced by the capital 
requirements that relate to them, this would imply a sharp increase in the cost 
and/or a reduction in the quantity of international lending to developing and 
emerging economies. Given the current very low levels of such lending, this 
raises the possibility of the current situation becoming ‘institutionalised’, so 
that, even if global conditions improve, the potential of international bank 
lending to contribute towards the development of poorer countries would be 
significantly reduced. 
 
2. The use of market-sensitive measures of risk – as envisaged in the IRB 
approaches – is inherently pro-cyclical. The fact that capital requirements will 
move in conjunction with the business cycle implies an amplification of that 
cycle as loans ‘migrate’ between bands as circumstances improve or 
deteriorate. The natural tendency of market practitioners – including bankers – 
to underestimate risks in booms and overestimate risks in recessions will thus 
be formalised, and legitimised, in regulation. Thus, in an upturn, the 
perception of generally reduced risks would result in lower capital 
requirements, further strengthening this perception of lower risk, but perhaps 
resulting in a longer ‘boom’ period and the build-up of greater levels of 
potentially systemic risk. Conversely, in a downturn or recession, higher 
capital requirements, as determined by the IRB approach, would reduce 
further incentives to lend, and – coupled with the difficulty of raising capital in 
a recession - create the possibility of a ‘credit crunch’ wherein even potentially 
profitable business propositions are unable to attract funding. The danger is 
that a downturn is turned into a recession, or an existing recession lengthened 
or deepened. 
 
These concerns about the potentially damaging impact of Basel II were viewed in the 
context of a more general analysis. This argued that that the major problems facing 
developing countries in their attempts to access international finance for purposes of 
                                                 
2 See Griffith-Jones, S. and Spratt, S.(2001) 'Will the proposed new Basel Capital Accord have a net 
negative effect on developing countries?' mimeo, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/finance/ifpubs.html  
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growth and development were a) the current low level of all types of flows 
(particularly, but not exclusively, bank lending) and b) the increasingly short-term and 
pro-cyclical nature of these flows. (Griffith-Jones, 2002) Given our view of this 
discouraging general environment, it remains of serious concern that the proposals for 
Basel II may exacerbate, rather than attempt to counter, these damaging trends. 
 
This paper will present the results of empirical work that we have undertaken to 
address the first point detailed above. We suggested in our most recent paper on this 
subject that one reason why capital requirements under the new proposals could be 
inappropriately high for developing and emerging economies, is that the benefits of 
international diversification are not taken into account. We suggested that, if it could 
be demonstrated that the correlation between developed/developed country lending 
was higher than that between developed/developing, then a case could be made that 
an internationally diversified loan portfolio, with a range of developed and developing 
country borrowers, would have a lower level of risk – in terms of the overall portfolio 
– than one which focused primarily on developed country lending. If this is, in fact, 
the case, then it would be possible – and certainly desirable – for the Basel Committee 
to incorporate the benefits of international diversification into the new Accord. 
 
This argument is similar to that used to support the recent modifications  (November, 
2001) resulting in the flattening of the IRB curve, with respect to corporate lending. In 
the original proposals for January 2001 it implicitly assumed that the average asset 
correlation was 0.2. However following empirical research initiated by the Committee 
(Lopez 2001) a modification to the IRB formula was proposed so that the correlation 
coefficient would decline from 0.2 to 0.1 as probability of default (PD) increased. In 
essence, the argument is that a higher PD for a corporate reduces correlation, as 
bankruptcy/default may be the result of any number of non-systemic factors that 
would not necessarily have any impact on the prospects for other corporates. 
  
The argument that asset correlation is variable is self-evident. Furthermore, the 
suggestion that this variability impacts upon the level of risk in an overall portfolio, 
and should therefore be reflected in capital requirements would also seem to have 
force. Consequently, we have followed this approach in our own empirical work, 
which, as we shall detail below, provides strong support for a similar modification of 
the IRB formula with respect to internationally diversified lending. 
 
It has long been argued that one of the major benefits of investing in developing and 
emerging economies is their relatively low correlation with mature markets. Therefore 
our first hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
H1 – The degree of correlation between the real and financial sectors of developed 
economies is greater than that which exists between developed and developing 
economies. 
 
We have tested this hypothesis of differential correlations, first with specific regard to 
international bank lending and profitability and, secondly, in a more general but 
supportive sense. All of our results offer significant support for the validity of this 
position. This has provided the basis for a second hypothesis, which relates 
specifically to the ongoing work of the Basel Committee:  
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H2 - An international loan portfolio which is diversified across the developed, 
emerging and developing regions enjoys a more efficient risk/return trade-off – and 
therefore lower overall portfolio level risk as measured by unexpected losses  - than 
one focused exclusively on developed markets 
 
In order to test this more specific hypothesis we have simulated levels of unexpected 
loss for two portfolios: one with a loan portfolio that is evenly distributed across 
developed and developing regions; the second with a portfolio that is distributed 
across only the developed regions. The results of these simulations provide 
convincing support for the second of our hypotheses. Suggesting that the level of 
unexpected loss that a portfolio focused on purely developed country borrowers 
would face in an extreme event, would be about twenty-five percent higher than a 
portfolio diversified across developed and developing countries. 
 
The fact that the tests we have performed, using a variety of variables, over a range of 
time periods, all provide strong evidence in support of our diversification hypothesis, 
seems, to us, compelling. This evidence is further strengthened by the results of our 
simulations of loan portfolios, which, by employing a similar methodology to that 
used by the most sophisticated banks, demonstrate the beneficial impacts of 
international diversification, as they would be viewed by the major banks. Taken 
together, this evidence suggests that, so as to not unfairly penalise emerging and 
developing economies, the Basel Committee should closely examine the practicalities 
of incorporating the benefits of international diversification into the forthcoming final 
consultative paper. It is hoped that the evidence presented below will demonstrate the 
validity of this view. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I details the sources of data and 
methodology used, section II presents the results of the econometric work, section III 
presents a simulation of two loan portfolios, section IV explores the implications of 
our results and concludes. Technical details on the statistical and simulation work are 
contained in the appendices.  
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I.         Data and Sources 
 
Countries analysed: 
Developing Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Venezuela, Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Russia, Nigeria, South Africa 
Developed Countries: U.S. Japan, Germany, Spain, France, U.K. Italy, Canada 
Others: Singapore, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Finland 
 
Variables analysed:  
 
Table 1. 
Grouping Code Description Time 
Period 
Freq Source 
Financial 
Sector 
ROA Return on Assets (banks) 1988-2001 Annual The Banker 
Financial 
Sector 
ROC Return on tier one capital 
(banks) 
1988-2001 Annual The Banker 
Financial 
Sector 
Syndicated  Syndicated Loans Spreads 93-02 Monthly BIS 
Bonds  GBI3 Global Bond Index 87-02 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters 
Bonds  EMBI4 Emerging Market Bond 
Index 
87-02 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters 
Bonds  EMBI+5 Emerging Market Bond 
Index Plus. 
87-02 Daily JP Morgan/Reuters 
Stocks IFC G6 S&P International Finance 
Corporation (Global) 
90-02 Daily IFC/S&P 
Stocks IFC I7 S&P International Finance 
Corporation (Investable) 
90-02 Daily IFC/S&P 
Stocks COMP Developed countries listed 
above: composite stock 
indexes 
90-02 Daily Reuters 
Macro GDP  GDP Growth Rate 85-00 Six-
Monthly 
 IMF, World Bank 
( Author’s own 
calculations) 
Macro GDP HP Hodrick-Prescott 
decomposition of GDP  
50-98 Annual National Data 
(Author’s own 
calculations) 
Macro STIR Short term nominal interest 
rate 
85-00 Six-
Monthly 
National data (BIS) 
or IMF, IFS 
Macro STIRR Short term real interest rate 85-00 Six-
Monthly 
 
National data (BIS) 
or IMF, IFS 
                                                 
3 The GBI consists of regularly traded, fixed-rate, domestic government bonds. The countries covered 
have liquid government debt markets, which are freely accessible to foreign investors.  GBI excludes: 
floating rate notes, perps, bonds with less than one year maturity, bonds targeted at the domestic 
markets for tax reasons and bonds with callable, puttable or convertible features. 
4 Included in the EMBI are US dollar denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local 
debt market instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. 
5 EMBI+ is an extension of the EMBI. The index tracks all of the external currency denominated debt 
markets of the emerging markets. 
6 IFC G (Global) is an emerging equity market index produced in conjunction with S&P. The index 
does not take into account restrictions on foreign ownership that limit the accessibility of certain 
markets and individual stocks. 
7 IFC I (Investable) is adjusted to reflect restrictions on foreign investments in emerging markets. 
Consequently, it represents a more accurate picture of the actual universe available to investors. 
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II. Results 
 
All the statistical significance tests we have undertaken provide strong support  
for our first hypothesis. Crucially for the validity of our results, cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) tests 
were undertaken in each instance. 
The purpose of the tests was to 
establish, for any given level of 
correlation, the probabilities that 
the developed/developed series 
and the developed/ developing 
series would have a lower level of 
correlation. The results of two of 
these tests are shown in figures 1 
and 2 (the remaining results are 
contained in Annex 1) as an 
example of the fact that, in every 
instance, the developed/developed correlation dominates that of the 
developed/developing correlation.  
That is, for any level of correlation 
(x), the probability that the actual 
correlation between developed and 
developing indicators is lower than 
x, is higher than the probability that 
the correlation between developed 
and developed indicators is lower 
than x. 
 
The results in Table 2 offer further 
support for the first of our 
hypotheses, in both a general and a 
specific sense. The specific, financial sector, results are presented first, followed by 
evidence from other, more general sources. 
 
Table 2. 
Variable Time-Period Frequency Developed/ 
Developed  
Mean 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Developed/ 
Developing  
Mean 
Correlation  
Coefficient 
Test Statistic 
(H0:Mx=My) 
Critical Value of 
0.05% one-tailed 
test in 
parentheses  
Syndicated 1993-2002 Monthly 0.37 0.14 3.33 (3.29) 
ROA 1988-2001 Annual 0.10 -0.08 4.40 (3.29) 
ROC 1988-2001 Annual 0.14 -0.11 6.92 (3.29) 
GDP 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.44 0.02 9.08 (3.29) 
GDP HP 1950-1998 Annual 0.35 0.02 9.41 (3.29) 
STIR 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.72 0.23 11.09 (3.29) 
STIRR 1985-2000 Six-monthly 0.66 0.22 10.93 (3.29) 
GBI-EMBI 1991-2002 Daily  0.78 0.53 5.45 (3.29) 
GBI-EMBI 1991-1997 Daily 0.90 0.74 4.64 (3.29) 
GBI-EMBI 1998-2002 Daily 0.42 0.09 5.87 (3.29) 
IFCI-COMP 1990-2000 Daily 0.58 -0.15 7.83 (3.29) 
IFCG-COMP 1990-2000 Daily 0.58 -0.17 8.06 (3.29) 
Figure 1. CDF Tests for Correlations on Syndicated 
Loan Spreads (1993-2002)
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Figure 2. CDF Tests for Correlations on Banks' 
Return on Capital (1988-2001)
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As can be seen from Table 2, all the results were tested to ensure statistical 
significance. In all cases, the results were significant at the 99.5% confidence level 
and the null hypothesis that the average mean correlations of the two series were 
equal (H0: Mx=My) was clearly rejected. 
 
     Discussion 
 
As is clear from table 1, a wide variety of financial, market and macro variables have 
been employed in our tests. Whilst it might be suggested that each of the variables we 
have used could be criticized as imperfect in some way, we would argue strongly that 
the possibility of distortions in the data are likely to be cancelled out, as they are 
unlikely to be the result of common causes. Consequently, the fact that every 
statistical test that we have performed, regardless of variable, time-period or 
frequency, has pointed in the same direction, and all are clearly statistically significant 
on a variety of tests, offers robust and unequivocal support for our first hypothesis.  
 
 In the case of spreads on syndicated bank loans, and adopting the reasonable 
assumption that they are indicative of the risk associated with the loans – and 
therefore a proxy for probability of default – it is clear that risks, as measured in this 
way, have had a greater tendency to rise and fall together within the developed 
regions than has been the case for the developed and developing regions. 
Consequently, this first result would appear to offer support to our hypothesis. That is, 
over the sample period of 1993 to 2002 a bank with a loan portfolio that was well 
diversified across the major developed and developing regions, would have enjoyed 
diversification benefits at the portfolio level: the correlation between the risks 
associated with loans to each of these regions would have been lower than was the 
case for a bank with a loan portfolio which focused only on developed markets.  
 
Similarly, the fact that the profitability of banks in developed markets are slightly 
negatively correlated with those in developing markets, whilst the profitability of 
banks within developed markets are slightly positively correlated, provides further 
support for our hypothesis of the benefits of diversification. Although there may be 
many factors affecting the level of profitability of a country’s domestic banking 
system, it seems reasonable to assume that one of the more significant factors would 
be the incidence of non-performing loans in the domestic economy. More generally, 
the health and consequent profitability of the country’s domestic economy must 
plausibly impact strongly upon the profitability of its banking sector. Thus, over the 
sample period, a bank lending to both banks and corporates across a wide range of 
developed and developing countries would have obtained diversification benefits, at 
the portfolio level, relative to a bank with a loan portfolio concentrated solely on 
developed markets. 
 
The results from the macro variables, whilst more general, give some indication of the 
extent to which developed economies have tended to move in step with each other to 
a far greater extent than have developed and developing economies. If we plausibly 
assume that the incidence of non-performing loans (NPL) in an economy is, at least 
partially, inversely related to the rate of GDP growth, then banks with an 
internationally diversified portfolio would be less likely to experience sharp increases 
in the incidence of NPLs in these markets simultaneously. Conversely, a bank that 
focused entirely on the – more highly correlated – mature markets would have a 
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greater chance of experiencing such an outcome. Similar implications can be drawn if 
we take movements in short-term interest rates as a proxy for the business cycle – 
rising rates indicating the close of an upturn and vice versa – these results provide 
further evidence in support of our argument. As with GDP growth, the fact that 
business cycles – and therefore movements in short-term interest rates – are more 
correlated between developed countries than between developed and developing 
countries, suggests that the incidence of NPLs and defaults are likely to be more 
correlated in the former than the latter. 
 
For many market practitioners, movement in government bond prices and yields are 
seen as a strong indicator of both economic fundamentals and market views on the 
economic prospects of each country. The fact that developed country bond prices 
move in step to a far greater extent than do developed and developing country prices, 
suggests a closer correlation between both economic fundamentals in developed 
countries and market sentiment towards them. The evidence of lower correlation 
between developed and developing stock markets also supports this view. To the 
extent that a country’s stock market reflects economic fundamentals and investor 
sentiment towards the country, a lower correlation between developed and developing 
countries provides further evidence in support of our first hypothesis. 
 
The evidence presented above clearly supports our hypothesis that a bank’s loan 
portfolio that is diversified internationally between developed and developing country 
borrowers would benefit in terms of lower overall portfolio risk relative to one that 
focused exclusively on lending to developed countries. In order to test this hypothesis 
in the specific context of a bank’s loan portfolio a simulation exercise has been 
undertaken to assess the potential unexpected loss resulting from a portfolio 
diversified within developed countries, and one diversified across developed and 
developing regions. 
  
III. Simulated Loan portfolios 
 
The testing of our second hypothesis involves the construction of two simulated loan 
portfolios, with the purpose being able to assess the probable level of unexpected loss 
in each portfolio. Thus we can directly compare the simulated behaviour of a portfolio 
diversified across developed and developing regions, with one focused solely on 
developed markets. 
 
The basic context for our approach and the results obtained are detailed below. 
Appendix 2 contains more information, as well as technical details of the construction 
of the simulated portfolios. 
 
 Context 
 
The fact that the quality of the credit portfolio of any bank can change at any time in 
the future means that there is a need to make frequent calculations of the expected 
losses that a bank could suffer, under a variety of situations. Given the constant 
changes in portfolio quality, it is unlikely that the computed preventive reserves will 
be the same for different periods. The difference between preventive reserves 
computed at different periods, (due to changing credit quality), is the cause of the 
potential losses to the bank - those that could erode their capital in extreme situations. 
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These losses are called “Unexpected Losses”. Our second hypothesis, in effect, states 
that the levels of unexpected loss for a portfolio that is diversified across developed 
and developing markets will be lower than that for a portfolio that focuses exclusively 
on developed markets. This hypothesis is supported, in principle, by the results of our 
statistical work above, which demonstrated the lower level of correlation between 
developed/developing markets than that which exists between developed/developed 
markets.  
 
 Simulation 
 
The approach we employ represents a modification of the well-known CreditMetrics 
approach, which has been widely used to simulate unexpected losses in portfolios. 
Following a similar approach, two simulated portfolios were constructed: one with an 
even distribution of loans across the major developed and developing regions8; the 
other with the loan portfolio evenly distributed across the developed regions. We then 
programmed an algorithm that simulated 10,000 different ‘quality scenarios’ that 
might impact on these portfolios, and so produce migration of loans between credit 
quality bands. Each quality scenario shows a change in the market value of the assets 
of the creditors in the portfolio, and therefore the difference between the initial and 
final credit quality can be assessed.   Once the credit portfolio quality scenarios have 
been simulated, it is possible to compute the losses/gains that come from the 
difference between initial and final credit qualities.  
 
The losses/gains obtained from the simulation process are used to build a histogram, 
which summarises the loss distribution of the credit portfolio. From this distribution a 
‘value at risk’ (VaR) is defined from which we obtain the amount of unexpected 
losses from the portfolio.9 The unexpected losses divided by the total amount of the 
portfolio represent the percentage that with, a given probability, (defined by the 
chosen percentile) could be lost in an extreme event.  
 
 Results 
 
The results obtained from our simulations offer strong support for our second 
hypothesis. The results are as follows: 
 
Table 3. Comparison of non-industrially diversified portfolios 
1. Diversified developed/developing 2. Diversified developed 
Total Exposure = 117,625,333.00 Total Exposure = 117,625,333.00 
Percentile  Loss value Unexpected 
loss (%) 
Percentile  Loss value Unexpected 
loss (%) 
Percentage 
Difference 
99.8 22,595,312 19.21 99.8 27,869,349 23.69 +23.34 
99.9 26,390,246 22.44 99.9 32,187,075 27.36 +21.96 
 
 
                                                 
8 Developing: Africa and the Middle East; Asia and Pacific; developing Europe; Latin America. 
Developed: EU (non-EMU); EMU; Other Industrial; offshore centres.   
9 There are, of course, many problems and critics of the VaR approach to risk management. See 
Zigrand (2001) and Persaud (2001) for example. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess 
these issues. For the purposes of this research, our simulation is designed to demonstrate – in broad 
terms – the relative difference in unexpected losses that would be likely to occur in each portfolio, in a 
similar fashion to that currently practiced by many major, internationally active banks. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of non-industrially diversified portfolios’ loss distributions 
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As can be seen from table 3, the unexpected losses simulated for the portfolio focused 
on developed country borrowers are, on average, almost twenty-three percent higher 
than for the portfolio diversified across developed and developing countries.  
 
 Discussion 
The simulated loan portfolios constructed offer clear evidence that the benefits of 
international diversification produce a more efficient risk/return trade-off for banks at 
the portfolio level. Given that capital requirements are intended to deal with 
unexpected loss, the fact that the level of unexpected loss in our simulation is lower 
for a diversified than for an undiversified portfolio, suggests that – in order to 
accurately reflect the actual risks that banks may face – Basel II should take account 
of this effect. 
 
It is, of course, always possible to question the assumptions which underpin any 
simulation. We have attempted to ensure that our assumptions are as reasonable as 
possible. One aspect that we considered in detail was that the decision to assume no 
industrial diversification within countries might prevent the benefits of such 
diversification in developed countries – which generally have a greater range of 
industries than do developing countries – from being taken into account. We 
concluded, however, that the potential benefits of such diversification may have 
traditionally been overstated. This position is supported by recent empirical work 
undertaken by the BIS.10 Using data from 105 Italian banks, over the period 1993-
1999, Acharya et al (2002) test empirically for evidence in support of the theoretical 
benefits of industrial, sectoral and geographical diversification. The results, though 
somewhat surprising, would seem to offer support for both the assumptions that 
underpin the loan portfolio simulation (i.e. no industrial diversification) and, crucially, 
the general findings or our empirical work. 
 
                                                 
10 Working Paper no. 118: Should banks be diversified? Evidence from individual bank’s loan 
portfolios. 
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From the combined results on bank loan return and risk, we conclude that increased industrial loan 
diversification results in an inefficient risk-return trade-off for the (Italian) banks in our sample, and 
sectoral diversification results in an inefficient risk-return trade-off for banks with relatively high 
levels of risk. Geographical diversification on the other hand does result in an improvement in the risk-
return trade-off for banks with low or moderate levels of risk. (op. cit: 5) 
 
However, in order to be certain that the simulation results have not been biased by this 
assumption, a second series of simulations was undertaken. In this instance, both 
geographical and industrial diversification was assumed. As can be seen in table 4, 
this modification – which brings the simulation closer to real practice - has the effect 
of halving the level of unexpected loss in the portfolios; thus they are now closer to 
the 8% figure often encountered in the real world, and which forms the basis of the 
Basel Committee’s stated capital requirements for the system as a whole.  
 
Table 4. Comparison of two simulated industrially diversified portfolios 
1. Diversified developed/developing 2. Diversified developed 
Total Exposure = 117,625,333.00 Total Exposure = 117,625,333.00 
Percentile Loss value Unexpected 
loss (%) 
Percentile  Loss value Unexpected 
loss 
Percentage 
Difference 
99.8 15,111,321 12.85 99.8 17,665,318 15.02 16.90 
99.9 15,358,788 13.06 99.9 17,960,850 15.27 16.94 
 The difference between the simulated unexpected losses in the two portfolios has also 
been reduced by this modification, although less so. However, at almost seventeen 
percent, on average, the difference remains highly significant, and so offers further 
evidence of the robustness of our results. 
 
Another issue that we have given consideration to is the fact that correlations are not 
constant over time. The danger, of course, is that correlations within emerging 
markets increase dramatically in crises, as contagion spreads the crisis from one 
country or region to another. In this instance, it is possible that a portfolio diversified 
across a range of emerging and developing regions, might be hit simultaneously in 
each of these areas. However, while this may well be the common perception of 
emerging market behaviour in crises, it may only apply to a limited number of cases, 
which require specific preconditions to be in place; preconditions, which at the 
current time – and indeed at most times - do not apply. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 
(2002) examine two hundred years of financial crises, in both developed and 
developing countries, for evidence of contagion. They conclud Tc eloped and  
DD -usl1999)19 -14.25  TD -0.4054  T391.-
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Kaminsky et al (op. cit) suggest that a crisis that spreads beyond regional boundaries 
requires an investment boom, or bubble, to precede it. In this way, actors beyond the 
region become involved in events there, and so the crisis may spread – via common 
creditors to some extent – to other emerging, and even developing regions. The 
current environment is certainly not one of boom with regard to capital flows to 
emerging and developing economies. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that such 
circumstances are likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future, ensuring that the 
preconditions required for system-wide contagion are not in place, and the benefits of 
widespread diversification will remain a reality. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) also emphasise this point. Their research suggests that 
financial turmoil in the ‘periphery’ (developing countries) only has systemic 
implications, such as contagion beyond the immediate region, when asset markets in 
one of the financial centres (developed world) is affected. “Thus, financial centers 
serve a key role in propagating financial turmoil.  When financial centers remain safe, 
problems in an emerging market stop at the region’s border”. (p.3)   
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The expressed purpose of the proposed new Basel Capital Accord is to better align 
regulatory capital with actual risk. This process, it is argued, will put bank lending on 
a sounder regulatory footing and remove the many distortions that have come to be 
recognised in the existing accord. We have argued that the current proposals run the 
risk of causing an increase in cost and/or reduction in quantity of bank lending to 
developing countries, as a consequence of the sharp increase in capital requirements 
for lending to lower rated borrowers. The response to this argument is that any 
changes in capital requirements are justified on the basis that, whilst the capital 
associated with lower (higher) rated borrowers is to rise (fall) significantly, relative to 
the existing situation, this merely reflects the more accurate measurement of risk.  
 
However, as we have demonstrated in this paper, the failure of the proposals to date to 
take account of the benefits of international diversification suggests that, in this 
instance at least, risk is not been accurately measured. That is, by excluding the 
possibility that banks’ capital requirements should take account of portfolio and 
diversification effects, the proposals effectively impose an inaccurate measure of 
actual risk, at the portfolio level. At present, the most sophisticated banks often do 
take account of the benefits of diversification in their international lending decisions. 
The fact that the proposals under Basel II will not allow these diversification benefits 
to be taken into account, suggests that the regulatory capital associated with lending to 
developing countries will be higher than that which the banks would – and currently 
are – choosing to put aside on the basis of their own models.   
 
The Basel Committee has already made a number of modifications to the original 
proposals of January 2001 (CP2). The most significant being the modifications to the 
IRB formula to take account of variable asset correlation as related to PD, and those 
relating to SMEs. Following the release of CP2 there was widespread concern that 
lending to SMEs would be adversely affected by a large increase in the capital 
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requirements associated with such lending. After intensive lobbying the Basel 
Committee has reconsidered the issue. The general changes to the IRB formula with 
respect to corporate lending – wherein the curve has been significantly flattened – will 
obviously be of benefit to SMEs. However, the Basel Committee has gone further. 
July 2002 saw the release of a document by the Basel Committee, which highlighted 
major areas where agreement had been reached. Of these, it was agreed that the 
treatment of SMEs should be as follows: 
 
In recognition of the different risks associated with SME borrowers, under the IRB approach for 
corporate credits, banks will be permitted to separately distinguish loans to SME borrowers (defined 
as those with less than Euro 50 mn in annual sales) from those to larger firms. Under the proposed 
treatment, exposures to SMEs will be able to receive a lower capital requirement than exposures to 
larger firms. The reduction in the required amount of capital will be as high as twenty percent, 
depending on the size of the borrower, and should result in an average reduction of approximately ten 
percent across the entire set of SME borrowers in the IRB framework for corporate loans.11 
 
Thus, in the case of SME and corporate lending, the Basel Committee has recognised 
the impact that differential asset correlation can have on portfolio level risk. Our 
results strongly suggest that a similar modification is justified with respect to 
internationally diversified lending. 
  
The specific manner that the Basel Committee might want to incorporate these 
findings is, of course, best left to them. Given the experience and expertise at their 
disposal we would not at this stage want to offer suggestions as to the means by which 
these modifications might be made. However, given the changes already made to the 
IRB formula with respect to corporates and SMEs, as well as the fact that the changes 
we propose would seem to have at least as solid an empirical basis, there are no 
theoretical, empirical or practical reasons why changes should not be made to 
incorporate the benefits of international diversification. We therefore urge the Basel 
Committee to incorporate these findings in the final consultative paper, due for 
release in Spring 2003, and would be happy to collaborate with the Committee in this 
important work, if it was considered useful. 
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Annex 1  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: Computation of Unexpected Losses  
(If you would like a copy of the appendix, please contact Miguel A. Segoviano 
m.a.segoviano@lse.ac.uk) 
Figure 1. CDF Test for Correlations on Syndicated 
Loan Spreads (1993-2002)
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Figure 2. CDF Test for Correlations on Banks' Return 
on Capital (1988-2001)
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Figure 6. CDF Test for Correlations on Stock 
Exchange Movements (IFC I-COMP: 1990-2002)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-.9
0 
TO
 '-
.8
0
-.7
0 
TO
 '-
.6
0
-.5
0 
TO
 '-
.4
0
-.3
0 
TO
 '-
.2
0
-.1
0 
TO
 0
.1
0 
TO
 .2
0
.3
0 
TO
 .4
0
.5
0 
TO
 .6
0
.7
0 
TO
 .8
0
.9
0 
TO
 1
.0
Deved/Deving
Deved/Deved
Figure 7. CDF Test for Correlations on Stock 
Exchange Movements  (IFC G-COMP: 1990-2002)
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Figure 8. CDF Test for Correlations on Bond Market 
Movements 
(GBI-EMBI+: 1991-2002)
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Figure 3. CDF Test for Correlations on Banks' Return 
on Assets (1988-2001)
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Figure 4. CDF Test for Correlations on GDP Growth 
(1985-2000)
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Figure 5. CDF Test for Correlations on Real Short-
Term Interest Rates (1985-2000)
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